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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
WALKER V. STATE: A SHOWING ON THE RECORD THAT, 
UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE 
DEFENDANT HAD KNOWLEDGE OF THE JURY TRIAL 
RIGHT SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT OF A KNOWING 
WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL. 
By: Katrine Bakhtiary 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the requirement of a 
knowing waiver of the right to a jury trial, pursuant to Maryland Rule 
4-246(b ), is satisfied when the record shows that, under the totality of 
the circumstances, the defendant had some knowledge of the jury trial 
right. Walker v. State, 406 Md. 369, 958 A.2d 915 (2008). More 
specifically, a knowing waiver is made when the record shows that the 
trial judge specifically knew the defendant had a previous jury trial 
experience, and, in such a case, the defendant is imputed to know the 
burden of proof in a criminal trial and that the jury trial would consist 
of a twelve-member jury. !d. at 385, 958 A.2d at 924. 
On July 24, 2005, Kevin Walker ("Walker") was arrested and 
charged with numerous violations, including possession of a forged 
document. Several weeks before trial, the district court received a 
demand for a jury trial from Walker's counsel. Walker's trial was 
scheduled in the Circuit Court for Howard County. On the day of 
Walker's trial, the state informed the court, on the record, and 
Walker's counsel agreed, that the parties were proceeding on a not 
guilty agreed statement of facts concerning the charge of possession of 
a forged document. A dialogue between Walker, his attorney, and the 
court took place, qualifying Walker on the record as to the not guilty 
agreed statement of facts. 
During the colloquy, Walker's attorney asked Walker if he 
understood the meaning of proceeding on a not guilty statement of 
facts and that proceeding in such a manner meant Walker was giving 
up his right to a jury trial. Walker acknowledged that he understood. 
The court then asked Walker if he understood he was waiving his right 
to a jury trial. Walker replied he did not know this at first but that he 
became aware that he was waiving his right to a jury trial. The court 
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then acknowledged that Walker had been before the same court and 
the same judge in a jury trial, and therefore, Walker fully understood 
jury trials. Walker agreed to the final statement by the court informing 
him that he was waiving his right to a jury trial in proceeding on a not 
guilty agreed statement of facts. 
The Circuit Court for Howard County found that Walker made a 
"knowing, intelligent and voluntary decision" and waived his right to 
trial by jury. Walker appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland on the basis that the circuit court erred in not determining, 
on the record, whether Walker's waiver of a jury trial was made 
knowingly, pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-246(b ). The Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland affirmed the lower court's decision. The Court 
of Appeals of Maryland granted Walker's petition for a writ of 
certiorari. 
The requirement of Maryland Rule 4-246(b ), that the waiver of a 
jury trial be made "knowingly," came from a revision to Rule 735, 
which required the defendant to have "full knowledge of his right to a 
jury trial." Walker, 406 Md. at 378, 958 A.2d at 920 (citing Abeokuto 
v. State, 391 Md. 289, 317-18, 893 A.2d 1018, 1034 (2006)). The 
revision indicated a desire to abandon a rigid requirement of the trial 
judge advising the defendant of the right to a jury trial through a litany 
of questions and instructions. Walker, 406 Md. at 379, 958 A.2d at 
920 (citing State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 724, 720 A.2d 311, 318 
(1998)). The court noted that the change in the rule mitigated the 
knowledge requirement for a valid waiver such that the defendant's 
knowledge did not need to be "complete or entire." Walker, 406 Md. 
at 379, 958 A.2d at 920-21 (quoting Bell, 351 Md. at 730, 720 A.2d at 
321 ). The court further explained that the right to a jury trial is waived 
when there has been an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of 
a known right or privilege." Walker, 406 Md. at 378, 958 A.2d at 920 
(quoting Powell v. State, 394 Md. 632, 639, 907 A.2d 242, 247 
(2006)). 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland discussed prior decisions which 
addressed the application of the "knowing" requirement. Walker, 406 
Md. at 379-81, 958 A.2d at 920-22. For example, a knowing waiver 
was made where the defendant was told the number of jurors in the 
jury and the standard of proof, despite the fact that the defendant was 
not informed that the verdict had to be unanimous among the jurors. 
!d. at 379, 958 A.2d at 921 (citing Bell, 351 Md. at 730, 720 A.2d at 
321). Similarly, when a defendant was not told the details of the 
process of selecting the jury, the court still found the waiver to be 
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knowingly made. Walker, 406 Md. at 380, 958 A.2d at 921 (citing 
State v. Hall, 321 Md. 178, 183, 582 A.2d 507, 510 (1990)). A 
defendant made a knowing waiver of the right to a jury trial by 
waiving the right after being asked seven times if he understood his 
rights and the nature of a jury trial, which was explained to him in 
"byte-size groups." Walker, 406 Md. at 380-81, 958 A.2d at 921-22 
(quoting Abeokuto, 391 Md. at 320, 893 A.2d at 1036). In examining 
these cases, the court noted that the determination of whether a waiver 
of the right to a jury trial was made knowingly depends on the facts 
and the totality of the circumstances of each case. Walker, 406 Md. at 
380, 958 A.2d at 921 (citing Hall, 321 Md. at 182-83, 582 A.2d at 
507). 
Walker argued that the facts of his case were more similar to those 
in a previous decision where the court found the defendant did not 
knowingly waive his right to a jury trial, and therefore, that case 
should be controlling here. Walker, 406 Md. at 381-82, 958 A.2d at 
922 (citing Tibbs v. State, 323 Md. 28, 31-32, 590 A.2d 550, 551 
(1991)). The court, in Tibbs, based its finding on the fact that the 
defendant did not receive any information concerning the nature of a 
jury trial, and the mere fact that the defendant had certain 
"unspecified" experiences with the criminal justice system was not 
adequate to find a knowing waiver of the right to a trial by jury. 
Walker, 406 Md. at 382, 958 A.2d at 922 (quoting Tibbs, 323 Md. at 
31-32, 590 A.2d at 551 ). 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland distinguished Tibbs from the 
present case, primarily because Walker's experiences with the 
criminal justice system were not "unspecified" since he had a prior 
jury trial with the same judge that presided over the trial at issue. 
Walker, 406 Md. at 385, 958 A.2d at 924. Additionally, the court 
found other facts on the record that showed Walker had some 
knowledge of his right to a jury trial. /d. at 382-83, 958 A.2d at 922-
23. The court focused on the decision Walker made to demand a jury 
trial which moved his case from district court to circuit court. /d. at 
382, 958 A.2d at 922. Also, the court noted Walker's attorney reached 
an agreement with the prosecutor, and Walker chose to proceed on a 
plea of not guilty with an agreed statement of facts. /d. at 383, 958 
A.2d at 923. Finally, Walker stated on the record in circuit court that 
he understood that he was waiving his right to a jury trial. /d. The 
court concluded that, considering the totality of the circumstances, the 
circuit court had an adequate basis to determine that Walker 
knowingly waived a jury trial. /d. 
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In relying on the totality of the circumstances, the court made clear 
that the "knowledge" element of a valid waiver of the right to a jury 
trial need not be explicitly stated on the record. Instead, trial judges 
may infer knowledge from the defendant's experiences. In 
considering this, defense attorneys should be aware that noting a 
successful appeal based on the validity of a knowing waiver of the 
right to a jury trial will be a challenge, unless the defendant stated 
unequivocally on the record that he either did not understand the right 
or process of a jury trial, or that he was not waiving his right to a jury 
trial. 
